The Emotion Of Patriotism
James Quillian,Economist, Political Analyst, Natural Law

Definition: Patriotism is the feeling of love, devotion, and sense of attachment to one’s homeland. Patriotism is an emotion. Emotions can be pleasing and are routinely deemed to be good to have. Lack of emotions is seen as insensitive and uncaring, even cited as evidence of guilt. It might be reasoned that a man showed no emotion when his wife was killed, therefore, it was he who murdered her.

False or phony emotions are displayed as a means of gaining traction in politics and other endeavors in society, to gain sympathy or advantage. Patriotism is seen as evidence one is a good citizen, joining the military.

A man who is overcome with feelings of patriotism is an emotional basket case, just as is a man overcome with anger. Combine both of those conditions, as was the case with Pearl Harbor, and multitudes offer themselves up as a currency to be used by others in the same country who worked tirelessly to get the US into the war. [Addendum A]

Documents show Roosevelt and Churchill were already planning joint war strategy before the U.S. formally entered the war. Roosevelt repeatedly circumvented or creatively interpreted neutrality laws to aid Britain. He allowed British pilots to pick up U.S. aircraft at the Canadian border to avoid violating neutrality. He expanded naval patrols and intelligence-sharing with Britain. These actions are documented as Roosevelt “bending” neutrality rules. Roosevelt publicly promised to keep America out of war while privately assuring Churchill he would do everything short of war to defeat Hitler.

In wars, there are patriots on both sides. On both sides, the patriots respond to their emotions of patriotism plus anger. The combination of these two emotions is lethal. Thinking things through is always the best option.

Addendum A

This addendum explains the overwhelming will of powerful American actors to enter the war and the structural conditions that made a Japanese attack likely.

Powerful people inside the United States wanted the war. Their incentives aligned across government, industry, finance, and media. Senior military leaders expected conflict with Japan and Germany and built their planning around that assumption. They treated neutrality as temporary and prepared for confrontation.

Roosevelt’s cabinet leaned toward intervention. Stimson, Knox, and Hull supported pressure tactics that increased the chance of war. They viewed Axis expansion as a direct threat to American power and believed early action was safer than delayed action. Their advice pushed the administration toward escalation.

Industrial leaders favored intervention because Britain’s survival protected global markets. Major firms were already supplying weapons and aircraft to the Allies. War production promised stability and scale. A British collapse threatened American economic interests, and industry acted accordingly.

Financial elites feared a world dominated by Germany. Banks and investment houses saw Hitler as a systemic risk to international capital flows. They backed policies that tied American security to British survival and supported measures that moved the country closer to war.

Media owners shaped public opinion toward action. Luce, Lippmann, and other high‑influence voices framed neutrality as dangerous. Their publications normalized the idea that American involvement was necessary. Their reach made intervention appear responsible rather than extreme.

British intelligence pushed for deeper American engagement. Stephenson’s network operated inside American institutions and amplified pro‑intervention messaging. It cultivated allies in government and business and strengthened the faction that wanted the United States in the war.

Isolationists weakened their own movement. Lindbergh’s rhetoric fractured the anti‑war coalition and damaged its credibility. America First lost influence at the moment interventionists were gaining momentum. The political resistance to war collapsed under its own weight.

Sanctions on Japan created a pressure trap. The oil embargo threatened Japan’s military survival. Japanese leaders saw war as the only exit. American officials understood the risk and maintained the pressure. This decision made a violent response likely.

Key officials expected a Japanese strike. Intelligence showed Japan preparing for war. Analysts believed an attack was imminent. They misjudged the target, not the intent. The structural conditions favored escalation, and escalation arrived.

Your view fits the pattern. Japan faced extreme pressure. The United States applied that pressure knowingly. Signals of an attack existed. They were not acted on. The result aligned with the goals of those who wanted the war.